Page 15 - The Indian EYE 041522

OPINION APRIL 15, 2022 | The Indian Eye 15

information from Russian sources, by the West. In future conflicts, it will
the evaluation is based on the out- be difficult to completely suppress
comes achieved by both parties thus Internet and social media. There-
far. The Special Military Operations fore, tactical forces need to reorient
appear to have commenced amidst and train themselves in fighting in a
a barrage of long-range operation- transparent domain.
al fires from Russian air and missile concLusIon
forces engaging high-value targets in Looking at how the events have
a set piece modus vivendi of shaping unfolded in the last four weeks, it
and softening the battlespace. The can be said that the Russian aim of
shaping operations were accompa- breaking the political cohesivity of
nied by a near simultaneous launch Ukraine through multi-domain mili-
of airborne land and sea-based oper- tary operations has not fully succeed-
ations. There appears to be a debate ed. Russia has been able to secure
on the force levels applied by Russia the Ukrainian nuclear power sites at
in the initial part of the military op- Chernobyl and Zaporiziya. The Rus-
eration. There are indications of a sian General Staff reported plans of
likely use of Airborne Forces (VKV) capitulation and submission of the
and the Special Forces (Spetsnaz) in Ukrainian forces within 48–72 hours
the initial phases. Russian strategy Ukrainian President Zelensky have not borne results.
appears to have been premised on Many key cities, including Kiev,
the fact that Russia would be able (Caliber) cruise missiles, Iskander mobile air defense systems. A dis- have not fallen despite facing four
to capitulate Ukraine with the shock ballistic missiles and MBRLs (Multi- advantage with mobile system is weeks of high-intensity operations.
of its firepower at the earliest. When ple Barrel Rocket Launchers) such as that, it may not be fully integrated These key cities which after capture
this did not happen amidst a strong Soviet-designed Grad (Hail), Smerch in the overall air defense archi- should have facilitated subsequent
West-backed Ukrainian resistance, (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) tecture. Air defense assets such as operations as launch pads are serv-
the Russian strategy seems to have multiple rocket launchers through- Man-portable air defense systems ing as islands of resistance. The Rus-
dithered. It appears that the appre- out the five weeks of the campaign. (MANPADS)-Stingers and lately the sian military operation has taken the
ciation of quick recapitulation of the This has partly compensated for sophisticated NLAW (New Gener- shape of grinding attrition warfare
Ukrainian government and support its scarce use of airpower and rein- ation Light Anti-Tank Weapon) and instead of the fast-paced manoeuvre
of the ethnic Russian and Ukrainian forced the usefulness of missiles and Javelin systems supplied by the US blitzkrieg. Long-range fire power on
population as liberators was faulty in rockets in future wars vis-à-vis aerial and the West are being operated by civilian and military infrastructure
the hindsight. Some of the military les- firepower, which is costly and whose Ukrainian troops and even militia. are likely being used to lower the mo-
sons based on operations thus far are losses are bad optics. According to In absence of a credible integrated rale of Ukrainian forces and civilian
covered in the succeeding sections. Russia’s Interfax agency, Russia has IFF (Identification Friend or Foe), population. Russians are attempting
aIrPower used its Kinzhal hypersonic missiles Ukrainian pilots too would be sus- to reconstitute combat power for a
The reluctance of Russia to use in Ukraine for the first time. A point ceptible to them. There is a lesson for possible long haul fighting in built-
airpower after initial two days is of concern is the indiscriminate loss- planners in investing in a dedicated up area operations (FIBUA). On the
perplexing as establishment of air es to civilian infrastructure due to Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Ukrainian side, the key takeaway has
superiority (or at least a favorable long-range fires. It seems to be point- Air Defence Organization (SEAD/ been the stoic resistance and ability
air situation) is a prerequisite for ing to a limited availability of preci- DEAD organization) with dedicated to extend Russia’s offensive beyond
successful ground operations. Rus- sion munitions and their selective platforms for dynamic targeting and the fourth week. The Ukrainian forc-
sia would have maintained a high usage on High Value Targets (HVTs) IFF, be it airpower, smart ammu- es were able to enforce caution on
operational tempo of operations by by Russia. nition, soft kill technology, damage the Russian air force and have forced
using airpower. The opposite nar- On the Ukrainian side, the fail- assessment means or low-cost assets the Russian ground forces to slow
rative was that it was done to avoid ure to counter Russian long-range such as drones. down and even pause their opera-
collateral damage to civilian areas. fires reflects the need for not only a BattLeFIeLD tional tempo. A flipside in Ukraine’s
Was the sub-optimal use of airpower robust missile shield for a defender, transParency defense has been the widespread
by Russia due to overconfidence or but also capable ballistic missile ac- In modern warfare, there are no damages to its towns and cities and
caution or due to the effectiveness quisition systems. advantages of surprise and decep- a massive refugee trail towards its
of Ukrainian air defense batteries, is IMPortance oF aIr tion at the operational level except western borders towards the border-
still unclear. Russian and Ukrainian DeFence for timings and intentions, as the ing European countries.
air missions and sortie generation Russia appears to have effec- battlespace is discernible due to ad- Colonel Deepak Kumar is Research
capabilities are still not public. What tively been able to target Ukrainian vanced ISR systems. Failure to read Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute
can be discerned is that both sides ground-based static air defense sys- intentions despite Russia reveal- for Defence Studies and Analyses, New
are not willing to take risks with their tems with ballistic and cruise mis- ing signatures in military exercises, Delhi
aircraft or pilots. For Russia, this has siles, anti-radiation missiles and land movement of 100 plus BTGs with ar-
prolonged their ground operations. vectors (using unguided weapons). mor and artillery, ship manoeuvres in Views expressed are of the author and
But, it can be safely discerned that However, Ukraine’s mobile-based Black Sea is telling. Another fallout do not necessarily reflect the views of
Russia has a distinct advantage in the air defense systems seem to be still has been the fact that the Internet the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the
air and this explains the reason why active. This is an advantage with has metalized into rural areas. Move- Government of India.
President Zelensky is pleading for a mobile air defense systems as it is ment of troops and weapon plat- This is the abridged version of the
no-fly zone. difficult to locate and destroy them. forms, military actions and even pro- article which appeared first in the
eMPLoyMent oF Long- A timely tactical intelligence and the paganda can be quickly transmitted. Comment section of the website (www.
range oPeratIonaL FIres use of more precision ammunition Russia’s inability to disrupt Internet idsa.in) of Manohar Parrikar Institute
Russia appears to have used long- by Russia would have achieved bet- communications in Ukraine have re- for Defense Studies and Analyses, New
range operational fires of its Kalibr ter results when targeting Ukrainian sulted in an information domination Delhi on March 28, 2022

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