Page 14 - The Indian EYE 041522

OPINION APRIL 15, 2022 | The Indian Eye 14

early Military Lessons from russia’s

special Military operation in ukraine

DEEPAK KUMAR

fter months of military build-
up and brinkmanship, Russia
Ainvaded its ex-Soviet neighbor
Ukraine in the wee hours of 24 Feb-
ruary 2022. Russian forces launched
a multi-pronged attack along three
fronts—Northern, Eastern and
Southern. It’s been more than four
weeks since then and the operations
still continue. An early analysis of the
conflict and war fighting so far, throws
light on some enduring lessons for the
military strategists and planners. This
issue brief aims to make the military
assessment by reconstructing the fol-
low up battle events of both the sides
up till now.
Russia began to create military A scene in Bucha in Ukraine
conditions for achieving its objectives
in Ukraine soon after a pro-Western
regime came in Ukraine in 2013. rity Treaty Organization) member (a) Defeat Russia’s invasion; and (b) for favorable outcome during nego-
Apart from bolstering its economy in a later time horizon. Liberate all Russian-occupied terri- tiations.
and molding politics and diplomacy, • Seeking neutrality guarantee tories including Crimea and Donbass Force LeveLs
Russia started developing military through constitutional amend- region. It is widely assessed that Russia
hardware self-sufficiency and reorga- ment. MILItary oBJectIves has about 170–175 Battalion Tactical
nizing its military organizations and • Recognition of independence of The likely military objectives of Groups (BTGs) across its five mili-
structures. Military exercises and DPR (Donetsk People’s Republic) the Russian special military oper- tary commands. From the available
actual combat situations in Syria put and LPR (Luhansk People’s Re- ations can be deduced as: (a) swift resources, according to estimates,
its armed forces to the test. To keep public). advance to the objective area, (b) de- a likely force level of up to 90–100
the battle narrative ambiguous, an • New government economically in- struction of Ukraine’s military poten- BTGs have been applied by Russia
intensive information warfare effort tegrated into the EAEU (Eurasian tial and armed forces, (c) capture and on three Army Offensives—North-
was devised. Russia concentrated on Economic Union). occupation of Eastern Ukraine— ern, Eastern and Southern. A stra-
accumulating a war chest capable of • Transparent borders between Rus- Donbass region and adjoining areas, tegic reserve of 20–25 BTGs (20 per
withstanding Western sanctions for sia and Ukraine. and (d) control of Baltic Sea and Sea cent of allocated BTGs) may have
a length of time. This pored itself in On the other hand, Ukraine of Azov. An early achievement of the been initially kept for reinforcement
building a foreign reserve of about aided by the Western powers may above military objectives was a ne- or contingency operations. It is very
US$ 650 billion and conserving sig- be having two immediate war aims: cessity to create military conditions likely that the remaining BTGs from
nificant reserves of gold. The second other Russian military commands
step was to sequence its above prepa- may have been staged closer to Rus-
ratory actions and the final step was sia’s western borders. Numerically,
the arrayal of forces and resources to Russia has applied a force of about
achieve the military strategy. 100 BTGs, airborne and special forc-
LIKeLy enD state es (approximately 2,00,000 person-
Russia’s likely or probable nel) against Ukraine’s defense forces
‘War Aims’ have been decoded by with a strength of 2,50,000 personnel.
inferring Russia’s likely end state, The force levels are nearly matching
which might be one or more of the whereas an offensive should have a
following: weight at least three times more. This
probably begets a question whether
• New Ukrainian government politi- the Russians spread themselves thin
cally aligned with the Kremlin (Re- on the battlespace.
gime change).
• New government militarily neutral evaLuatIon oF MILItary
and dependent on Russia for its oPeratIons
defense, and which could possibly Russian President Vladimir Putin Due to a complete blackout of
become a CSTO (Collective Secu- Continued at next page... >>

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