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OPINION DECEMBER 27, 2024 | The Indian Eye 12

absence of reliable international se-
with its significant set of challenges. curity mechanisms.
Retaining these weapons be-
The memorandum’s failure to
came a contentious issue both do- prevent aggression against Ukraine
mestically and internationally for profoundly impacts today’s discourse
Ukraine owing to the geopolitical on geopolitics and nuclear disarma-
and economic realities that it faced ment. First, it underscores the ero-
post disintegration of Soviet Union. sion of trust in international security
Although it inherited a vast number frameworks and the ineffectiveness
of nuclear warheads and delivery sys- of non-binding assurances in safe-
tems, the command and control of guarding sovereignty, which is high-
the infrastructure remained in Mos- lighted by Ukraine’s experience.
cow, leaving Ukraine partially para- Second, it amplifies prolifera-
lyzed in making use of the warhead tion risks. The Russian invasion of
independently, diminishing the stra- Ukraine and the numerous threats
tegic value of the weapon.
of the use of nuclear weapons have
deepened the divide between the nu-
On the economic front, things clear haves and the nuclear have-nots
weren’t looking great either. and reignited the discourse in the
belief that nuclear weapons are the
Maintaining a large fleet of The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the numerous threats of the use of nuclear weapons have ultimate deterrent, thus encouraging

nuclear weapons would’ve re- deepened the divide between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots (Agency file photo) states like North Korea and others to
prioritize nuclear retention. Third, as
quired a significant portion of nuclear powers change their strate-
Ukraine’s economy to be en- tion eventually proved critical as it role nuclear weapons continue to gies to counter countries like Russia,
allowed signatories to avoid substan- play in the security calculus of states non-nuclear weapon countries are
gaged perpetually in this. At the tive military intervention when Rus- that operate in an ever-changing geo- left vulnerable as they cannot rely on
same time, it struggled to sta- sia invaded Ukraine. The annexation political environment. the mercy of these states to ensure
their security and, by extension, their
The implications for the NPT
of Crimea in 2014 and the subse-
bilize its economy and transi- quent military actions directly con- are equally concerning. The case of survival in a volatile international
tion to a market-based system. tradicted the memorandum’s assur- Ukraine stands as a precedent that system.
ances, exposing the fragility of such weakens the credibility of the securi- Finally, it highlights the need
Maintaining a nuclear arsenal agreements in which major powers ty guarantees offered to non-nuclear to rethink alliances and deterrence
is prohibitively expensive, par- prioritize strategic interests over nor- weapon states under the NPT, poten- strategies, focusing on security guar-
mative commitments.
antees that are enforceable, and
tially undermining global non-prolif-
ticularly without external finan- Implications for Global eration efforts. For states like Iran strong regional security systems to
cial or technical support. Nuclear Non-proliferation and Saudi Arabia, which continue tackle the challenges of a multipolar
to operate in a highly volatile region, world. This requires reforms in glob-
he Ukrainian case serves as a the erosion of trust in security assur- al governance to balance deterrence
The international community, stark cautionary tale for states ances could spur nuclear prolifera- with reliable commitments, ensuring
particularly the US and Russia, were Tcontemplating disarmament tion, eventually complicating the ef- future stability and preventing viola-
adamant about preventing nuclear in exchange for security guarantees. forts to maintain regional and global tions.
proliferation in the post-Cold War The Budapest memorandum’s fail- stability. Prachi R. is a Research Associate at
era. A medley of these push and pull ure to protect Ukraine has led to the The Russia–Ukraine conflict has Indian Council of World Affairs, New
factors created a conducive environ- erosion of the trust factor in such as- highlighted the limitations of con- Delhi. Views expressed are personal
ment for disarmament negotiations, surance, casting a shadow of doubt ventional deterrence against nucle-
culminating in the 1994 Budapest on their reliability. In a world where ar-armed states. This dynamic also This article first appeared
memorandum on security assurances. international agreements are often risks thinking and discourse on the in the web articles section of the website
These assurances were pivotal undermined due to the shifting pow- return to great power competition, (www.icwa.in) of Indian Council of
in persuading Ukraine to transfer its er dynamics, Ukraine’s experience where non-nuclear weapon states World Affairs, New Delhi,
nuclear weapons to Russia for dis- raises legitimate concerns for coun- face increased vulnerabilities in the on December 16, 2024
mantling and effectively denuclear- tries that are facing security threats
izing its territory. Ukraine engaged or are dependent on the extended
in its disarmament program, and by deterrence of major powers.
1996, Ukraine had transferred all its North Korea’s strategy stands in
strategic warheads to Russia. stark contrast with that of Ukraine.
The US-funded technical and fi- By retaining its nuclear arsenal,
nancial support through the Cooper- North Korea has maintained a de-
ative Threat Reduction (CTR) pro- terrent capability that has arguably
gram, also known as the Nunn-Lugar ensured its regime’s survival despite
program, aided the process. The being deemed as a pariah state in the
memorandum was not a legally international society. Ukraine’s dis-
binding document, rather a political armament and its subsequent vulner-
commitment. Unlike NATO Article ability have likely reinforced North
5, which obliges collective defense, Korea’s resolve to continue resisting
the memorandum relied on political nuclear disarmament procedures for
commitments rather than enforce- external security guarantees. The
able legal mechanisms. This distinc- divergence underscores the critical

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