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OPINION OCTOBER 01, 2021 | The Indian Eye 14

agreement for 12 diesel pro- for balancing confidentiality
pelled submarines with France, and transparency.
analysts assume as a requirement The IAEA Director Gen-
of 22 submarines by Australia, eral Rafael Mariano Grossi in-
and then analyse the amount of formed that the AUKUS coun-
HEU needed to run the subma- tries had informed the agency
rines. One of the reports notes: about the agreement. He also
“if Canberra wants to operate told that the three countries
six to 12 nuclear submarines for communicated their commit-
about 30 years, it will need some ment to the non-proliferation
three to six tons of HEU.” Since regime by underlining Austra-
Australia does not have much ca- lia’s “exemplary non-prolifera-
pabilities in its nuclear establish- tion credentials”. He also noti-
ment and considering the urgent fied the willingness of the three
security imperatives, the US and countries to remain engaged
the UK will have to supply HEU. Prime minister narendra modi, US President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime with the “IAEA in the coming
One section of the non-pro- minister Yoshihide Suga and australian Prime minister Scott morrison months”. More significantly,
liferation community believes during the Quad summit, in Washington, DC last week (ani) he updated the international
that after the US becomes a par- community by stating that “The
ty to this deal, it will be difficult IAEA will engage with them on
for it to check such a deal signed this matter in line with its statu-
by another set of countries such tory mandate, and in accordance
as France and Russia with differ- with their respective safeguards
ent recipients such as Brazil and agreements with the Agency”.
China. It is anticipated that the The nuclear submarine
AUKUS deal could be followed business has overlooked some
by an uncontrolled proliferation. archaic alarms as far as the
Most of these apprehensions nuclear non-proliferation re-
and arguments fall in the grey gime is concerned. In India, too,
area. Stretching the non-prolif- some reports record displea-
eration argument too far may sure over the submarine deal
harm the cause of non-prolif- on the grounds that India was
eration itself. The bureaucratic denied similar deal in the past.
approach to non-proliferation Unlike Australia, India has an
regime—blurring the distinction australian Prime minister Scott morrison speaks during the Quad summit operational nuclear submarine
between a responsible coun- with Prime minister narendra modi, US President Joe Biden, and Japa- programme and a very robust
try and irresponsible means a nese Prime minister Yoshihide Suga, in Washington, DC (ani) nuclear industry. True, India
reckless proliferator—is risky. It may still need some of the tech-
allows the dangerous states to ar material and technology”. It with the IAEA should remove nologies or the submarine de-
clandestinely operate and trans- also indicates that Australia will apprehensions regarding the in- pending on its requirements,
act items, which may result in continue to fulfil its obligations terpretation of the Article 14 of however, the deal heralds a new
nuclear weapons. Australia has and will have an agreement with the Comprehensive Safeguards era. A country like India with
shown restraints, and as amply the International Atomic Ener- Agreement signed between established responsible creden-
discussed, the nuclear subma- gy Agency (IAEA). Australia and the IAEA. The tials, may also get the benefits in
rine deal has nothing to do with In fact, Australia signed a legal document signed between the future.
nuclear weapons. safeguards agreement in 1974 them explicitly gives direction Rajiv Nayan is Senior Research
Even legally speaking, the after ratifying the NPT in 1973, to the Australian government Associate at the Manohar Parri-
Nuclear Non-Proliferation due to which it became fa- what to do when nuclear mate- kar Institute for Defence Studies
Treaty (NPT), the mainstay of mous for promoting the tools rials are not under safeguards. and Analyses, New Delhi
the non-proliferation regime, of non-proliferation. In 1987, it A section of the internation-
does not prohibit development enacted the Nuclear Non-Pro- al community from time to time Views expressed are of
of nuclear submarines or trans- liferation (Safeguards) Act. It expresses scepticism of the in- the author and do not necessarily
fer of nuclear materials used as supplied uranium to several formation provided regarding reflect the views of the Manohar
propellant in the naval reactor/ countries after signing the safe- fuel, its composition, and naval Parrikar IDSA or of the Govern-
nuclear submarine. Moreover, guards agreements. Later, it reactor designs, naval bases and ment of India.
the joint statement underlines also became the first country to military fuel cycle fabrication This is the abridged version of the
Australia’s adherence to “the adopt additional protocol on 23 process. Australia’s commit- article which appeared first in the
highest standards for safe- September 1997. The text of Ad- ment to the safeguards norm Comment section of the website
guards, transparency, verifica- ditional Protocol was approved has been continued. Australia (www.idsa.in) of Manohar
tion and accountancy measures in the IAEA Board of Gover- has apparently demonstrated Parrikar Institute for Defense
to ensure the non-proliferation, nors meeting on 15 May 1997. enough confidence in its suppli- Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
safety, and security of nucle- The continued engagement ers and the IAEA on the need on September 29, 2021

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