Page 14 - The Indian EYE 051322

OPINION MAY 13, 2022 | The Indian Eye 14

The Russian government has as a tool of control. BGP is used by
stated that the legislation is in re- states to monitor and ensure censor-
sponse to the US’s 2018 National ship, block users and websites, carry
Cybersecurity strategy that aims to out cyberattacks on other internet in-
‘build a more lethal joint force’ and frastructures, and hijack traffic from
‘compete and deter in cyberspace’. other networks. Russia not only suc-
While Russian analysts justify their cessfully created a Sovereign Inter-
country’s concern vis-à-vis US big net named RuNet, out of concerns
tech companies’ influence, the flip- that the West can constrict its access
side is that the Russian government to global internet and to ostensibly
now has complete control over what protect its citizens from alleged dis-
its citizens consume online. Also, information and cyberattacks, but
Russian fear of the US cutting it out has also integrated the Donbas and
from the global internet is not in- Crimean networks into RuNet. Has
sync with her accusation of the US the current conflict between Russia
using its big tech companies’ plat- and Ukraine reaffirmed the Russian
forms to influence Russian citizens. campaign for Sovereign Internet?
This is because it would have been in Firstly, Russia established Ru-
American interest to keep Russians Source: “Ukraine Says Russia Wants to Destroy Donbas as Mariupol Prepares Final Defence”, Net to ensure protection from cy-
connected to the global Internet to The Hindu, 18 April 2022. [Click on the image for Larger View] berattacks. Russia’s Foreign Ministry
influence them. Russia’s Sovereign alleged that the US and its allies have
Internet law is based on politics sur- and regulations. Post-annexation, Donbas put together a group of internal “of-
rounding data routing which has led Crimea’s Internet infrastructure is Where Eastern Ukraine differs fensive cyber-forces”, attacking Rus-
to further fragmentation of the Inter- entirely integrated with the Russian from Crimea is the ambiguous po- sia’s critical infrastructure. There-
net in the region. network. The integration started with litical nature of its relationship with fore, RuNet, it seems, has not been
On the Ukrainian side, its Inter- the Russian-backed Crimean govern- successful in stopping cyberattacks.
net architecture is split between the ment building the necessary infra- Russia and Ukraine, with neither Secondly, as a result of Russia’s mil-
country having complete control
two global powers—the US, with a structure to replace the Ukrainian over the region. Russia’s attempt to itary operation in Ukraine, Western
few European ASes and Russia. It is network. control internet routing has been big tech companies and their plat-
connected to Russia through 95 ASes Secondly, Russia attempted to challenging because its network is forms have pulled out of the country.
(comprising Rostelecom, Rascom, truncate all direct links between far more complex with many more This, of course, does not equate to
and Transtelecom) and to the US Crimea and Ukraine. Ukrainian ac- actors operating in the region than in Russia being barred from the global
via ASes, mainly through the Hurri- tions did not help its case as it put Crimea. internet. ICANN and the US have
cane Electric AS. Ukraine’s connec- sanctions against ASes (Russian in- Reports note that even though repeatedly stated that the Russian
tions with Russia have fallen sharp- cluded) operating in Crimea post-an- there are several direct links between Internet will not be blocked.
ly since the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian nexation. This further diminished Russia and Ukraine, since 2014, the Therefore, Russian concern of
conflict. From 2019 onwards, the Ukrainian control and access to the data flow between these routes has being blocked from the global inter-
US has increased its AS connections region and resulted in the creation severely dropped. The level of Rus- net by the West has not materialised.
with Ukraine mainly due to Russia’s of small Crimean ASes connected to sian control over Donbas is hard to Thirdly, Russian backing of RuNet
attempts to control the data flow in Russia-registered ASes like Miranda access but according to research by to protect its citizens from alleged
Eastern Ukraine, especially in the Media, Crelcom, and CrimeaCom. the University of Paris, there are no Western disinformation too has not
Donbas region. Finally, Russia aggressively start- data routes between Donbas and been successful. Reports note that
ed building telecommunications in- Russians are finding several technical
Russian Virtual Control in frastructure to connect with Crimea. Ukraine anymore. workarounds to bypass the RuNet.
Crimea and Donbas Russia’s state-owned telecom com- Further, a data package from Finally, the creation of such splinter-
In the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian pany Rostelecom built a 110 Gbps Donbas directly reached Russia nets, have made the business of data
conflict, the regions of Crimea and submarine link called the Kerch without any rerouting. What this es- routing slower and more expensive
sentially means for Donbas locals is
Donbas, situated broadly on the east- Strait Cable from Russia to Crimea, that they have slower connectivity for in Donbas and Crimea, forcing the
ern and southern sides of Ukraine, costing $25 million. higher prices and complete Russian local governments there to unneces-
were vociferously fought over by Therefore, from 2014 to 2017, control on what they are allowed to sarily invest in infrastructure for con-
Russia and Ukraine. Following this, Russia gradually altered Crimea’s access online. nectivity with Russia. It would seem
Crimea came under Russian control internet routing routes, essential- Furthermore, the Donbas net- that Russia has not been able to fully
and the territories of Donetsk and ly moving data through Russia. work is now part of the Russian Sov- achieve the objectives which led the
Luhansk in Donbas came under the By mid-2017, no more data paths ereign Internet/RuNet indicating country to develop RuNet.
authority of Russian-backed separat- from Crimea were going through the possibility of online surveillance, Krutika Patil, Research Assistant for the
ist groups. Ukrainian ASes. This signifies that data capture, and censorship. Hence, Project on Cyber Security at the Institute for
Russia also has control over the Russia-influenced ASes started op-
region’s water and energy supply, in- erating in Crimea, establishing their Russian control over the Donbas net- Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
work indicates its intention to bring
ternet access, and crucial infrastruc- BGP agreements, and ousting the the entire Donbas territory under its Views expressed are of the author and
ture. By 2018, Russia had succeed- Ukrainian network. influence/ authority. do not necessarily reflect the views of
ed in the complete integration of As a result, since 2014, Crimeans the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the
Crimean and Donbas’ network with have been watching on the internet Government of India.
the Russian network. what Russians want them to see. For Is RuNet a Failure? This is the abridged version of the article
Before Russia’s successful in- the Russian Federation, the lessons The Russia–Ukraine conflict, as
tegration of Crimea’s economic, they learned from the Crimean ex- well as Russia’s 2014 annexation of which appeared first in the Comment section
of the website (www.idsa.in) of Manohar
bureaucratic, infrastructural, and periment were significant and they Crimea, draw light on the geopoli- Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies
informational apparatus, Crimea’s wasted no time in applying the same tics of data routing and the usage of and Analyses, New Delhi on May 4, 2022
network adhered to Ukrainian rules strategy to Donbas. the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)

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