Page 14 - The Indian EYE 090525
P. 14

OPINION                                                          SEPTEMBER 05, 2025        |  The Indian Eye 14



        justify nuclear use, would need to be
        defined.  Launching  an  early  strike
        against a nuclear adversary like In-
        dia—armed with a credible and ro-
        bust second-strike capability—could
        prove disastrous. Waiting too long,
        after the destruction of Pakistan’s
        conventional forces, would leave its
        leadership struggling to justify any
        meaningful military objective. Both
        scenarios  complicate  decision-mak-
        ing and undermine the credibility of
        Pakistan’s deterrence strategy.
            Furthermore, if Pakistan decides
        to use nuclear weapons, it must spec-
        ify the scope and type of deployment.
        Its ongoing signals indicate a prefer-
        ence for tactical nuclear arms, like
        the low-yield Hatf-9/Nasr. Nonethe-
        less, many studies highlight the se-
        vere consequences of such weapons
        in combat. While they might provide
        small  tactical  benefits—such  as  dis-
        rupting or psychologically disturbing
        enemy ground forces—their overall   Indian leadership has consistently stated that its response to a nuclear attack will not distinguish between tactical or battlefield nuclear use and
        military usefulness remains limited.
            However, if Pakistan were to use                                  a full-scale strategic strike (File photo)
        a battlefield nuclear weapon against
        a nuclear-armed  adversary  such  as   of nuclear retaliation. Violating this   aimed to gain through nuclear pos-  ar. Indeed, throughout the history of
        India—one with extensive delivery   norm could trigger a significant glob-  turing. Now, leading Pakistani com-  Pakistan’s nuclear weaponization,
        systems and high-yield warheads—it   al diplomatic backlash against Paki-  mentators, including some former   the strategic interests of the Western
        would essentially give India a license   stan, a country already widely seen as   diplomats, are realizing that Paki-  world, China, and, to some extent,
        to pursue the destruction of Pakistan.   a hub of terrorism.        stan’s past strategy of deterring and   West Asian countries have often tak-
        While India follows a ‘No First Use’   Yet, Pakistan continues to seek   blackmailing India has largely failed.   en precedence.
        nuclear policy, it explicitly states that   to leverage its nuclear status to de-  Write-ups in the Pakistani media and   While some of these interests
        any  nuclear  first  strike  will  be  met   ter India and to instill fear—both   think tank reports already reflect this   persist, the evolving global order
        with a massive retaliation intended   regionally and globally. Essential-  thinking. This quickly becomes the   and India’s rising stature within it
        to cause unacceptable damage.     ly, Islamabad views the display of a   dominant perspective, though some   are compelling these actors to re-
            Indian leadership has  consis-  nuclear threat as a strategic tool in   exceptions will always exist. It is   assess and recalibrate their policies
        tently stated that its response to a   conflict scenarios. Pakistan no longer   widely acknowledged in Pakistan that   towards a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
        nuclear attack will not distinguish be-  gains  a  substantial  strategic  advan-  India can undertake a limited war or   At present, Pakistan may retain a
        tween  tactical  or  battlefield  nuclear   tage from its nuclear posturing. India   strike without regard for Pakistan’s   marginal diplomatic advantage by
        use and a full-scale strategic strike.   has repeatedly challenged Pakistan’s   nuclear bluff. They openly discuss re-  projecting itself as an irresponsible
        The use of any nuclear weapon—re-  nuclear bluff—not only in response   viewing this strategy and replacing it   nuclear state. India must work pro-
        gardless of its yield—will trigger an   to the Pahalgam massacre but also   with a new, more effective one. The   actively to deny Pakistan even that
        overwhelming and indiscriminate   in earlier cases. Pakistan’s nuclear   Pakistani official statements may still   limited space, and India ought to be
        retaliation. On several occasions, In-  threats have failed to prevent India’s   deny this stark reality.  militarily prepared for the next stage,
        dian officials have also warned that   measured conventional respons-   At one time, Pakistan’s nuclear   calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff again
        if Pakistan introduces nuclear weap-  es, even when they are limited and   signaling  succeeded  in  convincing  a   and managing the influential global






        ons into the India –Pakistan conflict,   non-escalatory.            segment of the international commu-  actors more effectively.
        it could face consequences so severe   For example, on 10 May 2025,   nity—particularly in the West—that
        that they may threaten the very exis-  Pakistan used its familiar tactic by   its leadership, influenced by a jihadi
        tence of the Pakistani state.     unofficially  announcing  a  meeting   mindset, might resort to nuclear use.   Dr Rajiv Nayan is Senior Research
            The collapse of the long-stand-  of its National Command Authority.   However, the global perception has   Associate at Manohar Parrikar
        ing global nuclear taboo—if trig-  However, the government later offi-  gradually shifted. This shift, at this   Institute for Defense Studies and
        gered by Pakistan’s first use—would   cially denied that any such meeting   moment, looks silent even though   Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.
        not restrict India’s response. Paki-  took place. When the suspension of   a section in the Western policy   He has been working with the Institute
        stan’s leadership is highly aware of   India’s military operation occurred,   community has started coming out    since 1993
        these risks. While it often engages in   some  in  the  strategic  community   against Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail-  Views expressed are of the author and
        seemingly irrational nuclear brink-  speculated that Pakistan’s nuclear   ing tactic.                  do not necessarily reflect the views of
        manship, it does so with deliberate   signaling  had  pressured  the  world   Pakistan and India are now often   the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
        intent. Historically, whenever India   into accepting the truce. Interest-  casually grouped as nuclear-armed   Government of India.
        has  responded  decisively,  Pakistan   ingly, Pakistan’s self-defeating move   rivals. Notably, Pakistan and the
        has toned down its nuclear rhetoric.  to violate the suspension agreement   United States are also both nuclear   This article first appeared in the
            Since the atomic bombings of   within hours exposed the emptiness   powers, yet Pakistan’s  nuclear arse-  Comments section of the website (www.
        Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, no   of its nuclear signaling. India quickly   nal does not deter the US from con-  idsa.in) of Manohar Parrikar Institute
        nuclear-armed state has used these   responded to the breach, undermin-  ducting drone strikes on its territory.   for Defense Studies and Analyses, New
        weapons, even without the threat   ing any strategic advantage Pakistan   So, the issue is different from nucle-  Delhi, on August 27, 2025


                                                               www.TheIndianEYE.com
   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19