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OPINION APRIL 24, 2026 | The Indian Eye 11

by 2027. In the first 36 hours of Oper- because producers serve multiple
ation Epic Fury, Iran fired over 1,000 customers and can absorb losses.
munitions across West Asia. In re- Military procurement differs: often,
sponse, US, Israeli and allied forces the government is the sole buyer, so
fired more than 3,000 precision-guid- reduced orders can shutter produc-
ed munitions and interceptors. tion lines or close firms. Rebuilding
In view of the foregoing, it is capacity is difficult due to a limited
important to contextualize military workforce, labor-intensive systems,
engagement such as Operation SIN- and fragile supply chains, including
DOOR involving the armed forces vulnerable sub-contractors and for-
of India and Pakistan. The 87-hour eign dependencies.
technology-driven military conflict, India Requires a Hybrid
which witnessed one of the biggest Mode—Combining Advanced Ca-
air battles from stand-off ranges of pabilities with Robust Mass-Produc-
100–150 km between peer adversar- tion Capacity and Strategic Reserves
ies, besides extensive use of missiles, The post–Cold War decline
drones and AD systems and culmi- in US peer-adversary competition
nating with the Indian Air Force es- contributed to a lean, technolo-
tablishing its supremacy by targeting gy-intensive defense industrial base
Pakistani airfields and other military optimized for precision, “exquisite”
targets using some of the most ad- systems and short-duration wars.
vanced missiles available anywhere Russia’s approach in Ukraine has emphasized mass, depth and endurance (File photo) While highly capable, this model
in the world today. The question that has proven less suited to sustained,
merits deliberation is: Is Operation strikes on command-and-control levels. At the same time, it has ex- high-intensity attritional warfare
SINDOOR the template for all fu- networks, logistics hubs and indus- panded defense production—partic- that requires large-scale ammuni-
ture India–Pakistan conflicts? And, trial infrastructure. ularly drones and munitions—while tion and platform replacement.
how should India prepare for future The Russian government has balancing expenditure with replen- By contrast, Russia’s approach
wars? undertaken sustained and coordi- ishment capacity. Crucially, Russia in Ukraine has emphasized mass,
India shares borders with two nated efforts—both before and af- has shifted towards a war-of-attrition depth and endurance. In this con-
adversarial neighbors—China and ter the onset of the war—to shield model, leveraging manpower mo- struct, advanced systems are often
Pakistan—while also contending its defense industrial base from the bilization and industrial resilience enabling tools, while warfighting
with ongoing proxy wars and in- effects of Western sanctions and ex- rather than technological superior- effectiveness depends heavily on
surgencies. In this context, India’s port controls. The mobilization of ity. Despite sanctions constraining volume, stockpiles and industrial
armed forces and its supporting de- the defense industrial sector is part access to advanced systems, Russia throughput. Russia has sustained op-
fense-industrial ecosystem must pre- of this broader strategy, alongside has adapted by substituting, sourcing erations through continuous defense
pare for the most demanding con- the development of sanctions-eva- externally, and adopting lower-tech spending, expanded production
tingency: a protracted, large-scale, sion mechanisms to secure critical solutions, enabling it to sustain oper- shifts, reactivation of dormant facil-
two- or even two-and-a-half-front resources and maintain the supply ations over time. ities, and large-scale refurbishment
conventional war. Scenarios short of of military equipment necessary for In its war in Ukraine, Russia has of Soviet-era equipment, thereby
this threshold can be managed with- a protracted war. lost thousands of tanks across differ- offsetting heavy battlefield losses.
in the existing capabilities of the In- Russia anticipated Western ent generations. However, it retains For India, the key lesson is the
dian armed forces. sanctions well in advance and pre- extensive Soviet-era stockpiles of importance of balancing techno-
Two important factors under- pared through its ‘Fortress Russia’ tanks and other armored vehicles, logical sophistication with scalable
pinning Russia’s capacity to sustain strategy, supported by the Central which it is using to replace battle- industrial capacity. A defense eco-
a prolonged war are its doctrinal ap- Bank’s effective crisis response, field losses. This reliance on stored system optimized only for high-
proach to warfare and the resilience which blunted the expected eco- equipment allows Russia to sustain end platforms risks constraints in
of its defense industrial base, despite nomic shock. It also strengthened the conflict for several more years, prolonged war scenarios. Equally
continued economic pressure from economic ties with China and other effectively prioritizing quantity over important is maintaining depth in
Western sanctions. Its war effort has non-Western partners. After sanc- quality in its force structure. ammunition stocks, surge produc-
been supported by strong energy tions were imposed, Moscow adopt- The contrasting experiences of tion capability, and resilient supply
revenues, careful financial manage- ed additional counter-measures, in- the US and Russia highlight import- chains that can be rapidly mobilized
ment, and the willingness of several cluding sanctions-evasion networks. ant lessons for India’s defense pre- in wartime.
countries to continue trading despite These involved the use of front paredness and industrial strategy. A hybrid model—combining
the threat of sanctions. Additional- companies in third countries, along Sustainment should be elevated advanced precision capabilities with
ly, Russia has been able to procure with alternative mechanisms such as to a Formal Principle of War robust mass-production capacity and
weapons and equipment from part- cryptocurrencies and barter trade, to Armed forces worldwide con- strategic reserves—offers the most
ners such as North Korea. access restricted goods and sustain front several challenges in sustain- credible path for sustaining high-in-
Russia’s concept of operations economic and military resilience. ing large-scale combat operations, tensity operations over time.
in Ukraine has evolved significantly Drawing on International Insti- whether offensive or defensive. To Views expressed are of the author and
since the initial invasion in Febru- tute for Strategic Studies (IISS) as- address these, sustainment should do not necessarily reflect the views of
ary 2022. It has transitioned from an sessments in The Military Balance, be elevated to a formal principle of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
early attempt at rapid regime change Russia’s ability to sustain a protract- war, highlighting the strategic im- Government of India.
and a decisive military victory to a ed war despite sanctions rests on ad- portance of logistics and reinforcing
prolonged attritional campaign cen- aptation, scale and resource depth. the need to integrate the defense The full version of this article first ap-
tered on making incremental gains Russia has offset heavy battlefield industrial base more effectively into peared in the Comments section of the
and consolidating territory in eastern losses by drawing extensively on vast deterrence and defense strategies. website (www.idsa.in) of Manohar Par-
Ukraine and degrading Ukrainian Soviet-era stockpiles, refurbishing In civilian markets, fluctuating rikar Institute for Defense Studies and
military capability through sustained older equipment to maintain force demand rarely proves catastrophic Analyses, New Delhi, on April 14, 2026

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