Page 12 - The Indian EYE 111921

OpINION NOVEMBER 19, 2021 | The Indian Eye 12

chinese Pla’s Western theatre command

(Wtc) in transition and challenges for india

WTC has significant impact on India as the two countries are involved in a border standoff and as it is tailored towards
reducing its vulnerabilities against India’s superior airpower, any strengthening of its combat capabilities in this area
would have an impact on India’s choices to conduct offensive operations

M.S. PRATHIBHA

he PLA Western Theatre
Command has undergone
Tchanges that are required for
it to transform from a military region
to a theatre command. The theatre
command requirements made it to
adopt various strategies to strength-
en its joint combat capabilities and
realistically train its troops by seeking
ways to counter the adversary’s mili-
tary capability in mind. This requires
it to counter the operational system
of the adversary to emerge victorious
in battle. Since the conventional ca-
pabilities of the PLA WTC have tre-
mendous impact on India, especially
their effort to significantly increase
their air defence and reconnaissance
capabilities, the integrated training
exercises are aimed at countering
both the mountain warfare and air
capabilities of India.
The Western Theatre Command A People’s Liberation Army (PLA’s) tank during the recent disengagement process between the armies of India and China in Ladakh (ANI)
(WTC), one of the five theatre com-
mands of the People’s Liberation fore, the transition of WTC into a is meant to prepare the Chinese mili- i.e., the operational capability of the
Army (PLA), considers India as one theatre of war zone capability has an tary to train and prepare for an even- adversary. The commanders are en-
of the security threats in its strategic immense impact on India. tuality of war. One of the require- couraged to find realistic solutions to
direction. The WTC strategic di- The PLA WTC is distinct com- ments is that the “operational forces” defeat the adversary through innova-
rection also faces the Central Asian pared to other theatre commands as are supposed to implement the “bri- tive use of equipment.
region and the Af-Pak region. How- the two military districts, the Tibet gade-battalion new system”, and for In fact, the WTC is working to-
ever, there are differences in the Military District and Xinjiang Mil- the Air Force, the “base-brigade new wards building joint capability that is
ways threats from Central Asia and itary District, have come under the command system”. focused on achieving “integration”,
Af-Pak are managed. China prefers direct control of the PLA Army. For Taking the WTC in particular, in as such “integration training” is part
to use the security framework of the instance, after the 2015 reforms, the one of the training exercises, the PLA of base normalisation, which is con-
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation National Defence Mobilisation Com- WTC focused on countering the ad- ducted every month. In other words,
(SCO), such as the counter-terrorism mittee of the Central Military Com- versary’s reconnaissance capabilities the PLA Air Force is determined
cooperation and the Belt and Road mission has been administering and to prevent them from observing the to normalise the base towards con-
Initiative (BRI) to mitigate threats to leading the provincial military dis- PLA’s deployment patterns. Deny- ducting integrated training, which
its restive Xinjiang. Moreover, these tricts. However, the Tibet and Xinji- ing reconnaissance on deployments are generally organised by brigade
threats are mostly from non-state ac- ang military districts have an elevated is part of joint combat exercise un- commanders and chief of staff. In a
tors and consequently, the People’s status of deputy theatre (level) unit, der information conditions, where typical integrated training, including
Armed Police (PAP) are in charge indicating that their role as well as electronic counter-measures are de- Air Force and Ground Forces, fight-
of monitoring and countering them. mission have been expanded. ployed to counter the adversary from er aircrafts raid the mountain ridges
They are not considered as conven- After the reforms, the PLA observing the troop deployment. to knock out the adversary’s radar
tional military threats. On the con- WTC’s main priority has been to es- Such exercises are increasingly being positions, guide missile tanks to infil-
trary, the majority of the WTC mili- tablish a system of transition, where part of the WTC’s operational plan- trate canyons to appear at mountain
tary reforms in joint training modules the theatre region could transform ning, as the emphasis is on the troops passes to strike important targets and
and joint operations, especially in the from functioning as a military region to understand the military capabil- air defence system is tested to show
combined arms brigade and multi-di- into a war zone. In other words, the ities of the adversary and then train response level of tracking, reconnais-
mensional operations indicate that it “Military Area Command” (MAC) themselves realistically. The principle sance and real-time surveillance.
is training for a “limited war” with an model seemed to be incompatible if of actual combat capability means In recent years, integrated joint
adversary with characteristics similar the objective was to win wars. The es- that the training exercises should operations in the WTC have en-
to Indian military capability. There- tablishment of the theatre command reflect the actual threat condition, Continued at next page... >>

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