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OPINION MAY 02, 2025 | The Indian Eye 10

vinced Beijing that this approach is comprising about 20 per cent of the
no longer viable. According to data global LNG trade. Given this stra-
from Pakistan’s National Counter tegic significance, any increase in
Terrorism Authority (NACTA), be- Chinese security or military presence
tween 2021 and 2024, a total of 20 in the area could substantially alter
Chinese citizens have been killed and maritime security dynamics. Such
34 injured in 14 terrorist attacks tar- developments are likely to influence
geting Chinese interests. regional alignments involving Gulf
states and Western naval powers,
PERSISTENT SECURITY with potential ramifications for in-
LAPSES ternational trade routes and broader
geopolitical stability.
D espite public displays of ca- CONCLUSION
maraderie,
China–Pakistan
relations are facing growing
Pakistan faces the challenge of
undercurrents of strain, largely fu- balancing its sovereignty with the
elled by persistent security lapses Despite public displays of camaraderie, China–Pakistan relations are facing growing undercur- imperative of securing Chinese in-
on Pakistani soil. The situation has rents of strain, largely fuelled by persistent security lapses on Pakistani soil (Agency file photo) vestments that it perceives as being
worsened in the aftermath of the vital for its economic development.
US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Allowing foreign security entities to
which unleashed a new wave of mil- and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), bration of Beijing’s strategic posture. operate within its borders risks un-
itant activity in the region. At the which has repeatedly and successful- More importantly, it raises urgent dermining Islamabad’s control over
same time, the BLA has openly op- ly targeted Chinese personnel and questions about the possibility of Pa- internal security affairs.
posed Chinese investments, viewing infrastructure. The TTP has target- kistan’s eroding decision-making ca- This is not a new situation for
them as an extension of Islamabad’s ed Dasu Hydropower Project twice. pacity, growing dependency, and its Pakistan. It experienced a similar
longstanding exploitation of Baloch- These failures have underscored the capacity to maintain control over its phase with the US, when American
istan and its natural resources. This systemic vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s own security landscape. private contractors operated freely
perception has fuelled repeated and internal security framework and within the country, compromising
deadly attacks on Chinese personnel prompted China to press for a more REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS both sovereignty and public safety.
and strategic infrastructure linked to direct role. The situation reached a flashpoint
the CPEC. The latest news of Islamabad hina’s expanding security pres- in January 2011 with the arrest of
Thus, Beijing’s confidence in Is- allowing Chinese security personnel ence in Pakistan, particularly
lamabad’s ability to secure its inter- marks a departure from Pakistan’s Cthrough PSCs, is introducing Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor
involved in the fatal shooting of two
ests is waning. In 2024 alone, nine existing legal norms (since 2012) new layers of strategic complexity in Pakistani nationals in Lahore. The
Chinese nationals were killed in which prohibit foreign PSCs from South Asia. Should the number of incident triggered widespread public
separate attacks across Pakistan— operating independently and man- Chinese security personnel increase outrage and raised questions about
including high-profile assaults on date that only local personnel be em- at additional CPEC sites, regional foreign overreach, leading to a re-
critical sites such as the Dasu Hy- ployed if such firms are permitted. concerns are likely to intensify. Of strictive ban on foreign PSCs. How-
dropower Project and Karachi’s Jin- This move reflects Beijing’s growing particular note is the fact that the ever, foreign PSCs continue to oper-
nah International Airport. These impatience with Islamabad’s inability CPEC passes through Pakistan’s il- ate illegally within Pakistan.
incidents have prompted serious re- to deliver on promises. Much of this legally occupied regions of Jammu A similar scenario could play
assessments within Chinese strategic is rooted in Pakistan’s longstanding and Kashmir—territory claimed by out again—this time with China.
circles, with growing concern over policy of tolerating or supporting India—and culminates at the stra- Anti-China sentiment is already
Pakistan’s reliability as a security militant groups for strategic lever- tegic Gwadar Port near the Strait of simmering, particularly in insurgen-
provider to Chinese nationals. age, particularly in Afghanistan and Hormuz. The deployment of Chinese cy-prone regions like Balochistan,
In response to Beijing’s mount- Kashmir. Many of these groups have PSCs in these sensitive areas may
ing concerns, Islamabad revamped since splintered or radicalised, redi- heighten regional tensions. where foreign involvement is often
viewed with deep suspicion. An ex-
its counter-terrorism posture and, recting their violence inward and de- Strategically, the presence of panded Chinese security presence
in June 2024, launched Azm-e-Iste- stabilising Pakistan itself. Chinese PSCs near critical maritime may inadvertently lend weight to
hkam (translated as ‘Commitment China’s increasing involvement chokepoints such as the Gwadar separatist narratives, fuelling unrest
to Stability’). This marked a new in intelligence and domestic security Port also raises significant concerns. rather than alleviating it.
phase following the earlier cam- operations within Pakistan signals a Gwadar’s proximity to the Strait of
paign Radd-ul-Fasaad (‘Rejection deeper mistrust. For instance, in the Hormuz—a crucial artery for global Views expressed are of the author and
of Strife’), which ran from 2017 to 2021 attack on Dasu Hydropower energy supplies—amplifies these ap- do not necessarily reflect the views of
2024. Since 2016, the Pakistani mil- Project, Pakistani government sourc- prehensions. In 2022, approximately the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
itary has also created specialised se- es had initially attributed this to an 21 million barrels of oil per day tran- Government of India.
curity formations—namely the 34th accident, with Beijing pointing out a sited through the strait, accounting Namita Barthwal is a Research Analyst
and 44th Light Infantry Divisions— few hours later that it was, in fact, a for around 21 per cent of global pe- at the Military Affairs Centre of the
tasked with protecting CPEC proj- terror case. Such direct interference troleum liquids consumption. This Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence
ects. These units, supported by the reveals not only the fragility of Paki- figure represents nearly 30 per cent Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA),
local police, are mandated to provide stan’s internal governance but also of the world’s seaborne oil trade, where her research focuses on Chi-
route security, gather intelligence the shrinking space for sovereign de- with 70 per cent of these exports na-Pakistan military cooperation.
and ensure rapid response to emerg- cision-making. bound for Asian markets.
ing threats. In 2024, multiple rounds of Moreover, the Strait of Hormuz This article first appeared in the Com-
Despite these measures, Paki- high-level discussions eventually led is a vital corridor for liquefied natu- ments section of articles section of the
stan’s security apparatus has strug- to Islamabad acquiescing to allow a ral gas (LNG) shipments. All LNG website (www.idsa.in) of Manohar Par-
gled to contain the threat, particular- Chinese security footprint on Paki- exports from Qatar and the Unit- rikar Institute for Defence Studies and
ly from the BLA’s, Majeed Brigade stani soil. This represents a recali- ed Arab Emirates pass through it, Analyses, New Delhi, on April 19, 2025

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