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OPINION MARCH 27, 2026 | The Indian Eye 10

Cyber Operations in the

Israel–US Conflict with Iran

Senior US military officials stated that coordinated cyber and space activities degraded

Iranian communications, sensors and command-and-control networks

CHERIAN SAMUEL
yberattacks have formed an
important supporting com-
Cponent of the joint Israel–US
campaign against Iran. However, the
sheer intensity of the kinetic con-
flict has largely put these operations
in the shade. As is increasingly the
trend in modern conflict, cyber ca-
pabilities were employed to advance
both tactical and strategic objectives
in the early stages of the conflict.
Cyber operations play a critical
role in shaping the battlefield, with
actions designed to weaken the
adversary’s defences, morale and Courtesy: IDSA
command capabilities before kinetic
hostilities commence. The combined
capabilities of the United States and
broken into municipal traffic-camera
Israel ensured that a range of such reported that Iran’s internet connec- networks and used the live feeds to erations underscore the use of cyber
tivity dropped to about 4 per cent of
capabilities not only for disruption
actions were undertaken even before normal levels due to multi-layered assess missile-strike damage, track but also for shaping perception and
the first bombs were dropped. attacks on BGP routing, DNS infra- emergency-response movements, influencing behaviour.
Senior US military officials
stated that coordinated cyber and structure and SCADA/ICS systems, and identify whether specific targets Iran’s Cyber Capabilities and
with some regions experiencing
had been successfully hit. Such capa-
space activities degraded Iranian near-total blackouts. Who was re- bilities highlight the role of cyber ac- Response
communications, sensors and com-
Over the years, Iran has signifi-
mand-and-control networks. Ac- sponsible for this was difficult to as- cess in enabling precision targeting, cantly expanded its cyber warfare
sess, as the Iranian government had
blurring the line between intelligence
cording to Gen. Dan Caine, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, itself imposed a blackout to prevent collection and operational execution. capabilities since the 2010 Stuxnet
“The first movers were USCYBER- civil unrest, which was likely inten- Information Warfare and attack, widely believed to be a joint
sified by coordinated external cyber
Israel–US operation that caused its
COM and USSPACECOM, layering and military operations targeting Ira- Psychological Operations nuclear centrifuges to spin out of
non-kinetic effects, disrupting and nian communications infrastructure. Coordinated cyberattacks simul- control, evolving from limited DDoS
degrading and blinding Iran’s ability Among the initial strategic ob- taneously targeted Iranian digital and wiper malware to sophisticated
to see, communicate and respond.” jectives was the decapitation of the infrastructure. Described in some state-sponsored cyber operations
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth also regime. In the early phase of the con- reports as the “largest cyberattack in including large-scale destructive
alluded to “classified effects”, which, flict, Trump’s messaging implied that history”, these operations disrupted attacks, espionage, supply chain at-
in US military parlance, refers to the regime change or regime collapse in government websites, mobile appli- tacks, and identity weaponisation
outcomes produced by an operation, Iran could be a potential outcome of cations and online platforms through with remote wipe commands affect-
not merely the tools employed, un- the war. Among the tactical steps un- outages and defacements. Follow- ing hundreds of thousands of devices.
derscoring the emphasis on integrat- dertaken in pursuit of this goal was ing Israeli strikes on facilities of the The Stuxnet attack served as a cata-
ed effects across the cyber, space and targeting the entire regime leader- state broadcaster IRIB, Israeli forc- lyst, or “awakening”, prompting Iran
kinetic domains. ship, including Ayatollah Khamenei. es reportedly hijacked the broadcast to invest heavily in cyber capabilities,
Early Operational Effects According to reports, Israeli in- feed to air political messages urging resulting in a 1,200 per cent increase
On the second day of the conflict, telligence leveraged existing access resistance against the Iranian gov- in cybersecurity budgets in the years
the Israeli Defence Forces claimed to Tehran’s traffic camera network ernment. Additional psychological following the incident.
in a statement that the headquarters and mobile phone infrastructure to operations included the compromise Iran has developed advanced
of the IRGC’s “cyber and electronic trace the movements of the Iranian of a widely used Iranian prayer ap- cyber capabilities distributed primar-
headquarters” and its “Intelligence leadership with unprecedented pre- plication, through which messages ily across organisations such as the
Directorate” were destroyed in aeri- cision. In earlier reports, Israeli offi- encouraging security personnel to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
al strikes. Monitoring organisations cials had said Iranian operators had defect were disseminated. These op- Continued on next page... >>

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