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OPINION JANUARY 16, 2026 | The Indian Eye 11

tive thus seeks to sidestep the influence sectors, which it also considers crucial of spillover of insecurity in the broad- nectivity and contact, and New Delhi’s
of other actors driven by competing in- to improving the security environment. er region. For instance, in November renewed economic and humanitarian
terests and geopolitical rivalries. The Taliban, for their part, are keen to 2025, Chinese companies and nationals engagement with Afghanistan, aligns
At a time when Pakistan is secu- utilize the demonstrative effect of Chi- employed on projects in southern Tajik- with the approach of the Central Asian
ritizing Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, nese economic activities to attract oth- istan were attacked from Afghanistan’s States, which are keen to avoid being
for its own reasons, the Central Asian er regional and international players. Badakhshan province, which borders caught in geopolitical rivalries and to
States remain committed to utiliz- Pakistan has thus become an outlier in both Tajikistan and China. Subsequent- assert their independent role in shap-
ing Afghanistan as a gateway to new securitizing Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, ly, the Chinese embassy in Dushanbe ing the regional agenda on Afghan-
economic and trade opportunities, while other neighboring and regional advised Chinese companies and per- istan. The Central Asian States are
enhanced connectivity through the countries continue to priorities prag- sonnel to evacuate the border areas. emphasizing a coordinated approach
Southern logistics route to the Indian matic engagement. Facing renewed instability in the to developing a trans-Afghan trans-
Ocean. Islamabad’s frequent closures At the same time, China shares bordering regions, China has also port and transit connectivity network,
of border crossing points to coerce the Pakistan’s concerns about the Teh- enhanced its bilateral engagement including gas pipelines and electricity
authorities in Kabul have also affected reek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which with the Taliban to address security transmission, to deepen economic in-
the landlocked Central Asian States, poses growing security risks to Chinese concerns. In August 2025, Chinese terdependence and enhance the re-
prompting Uzbekistan to take greater personnel and projects in the China–Pa- Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during his gion’s leverage over Kabul.
interest in utilizing Iran’s Chabahar kistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Bei- second visit to Afghanistan since 2022, Iran, in a bid to enhance its transit
Port. The inaugural trilateral political jing also shares Pakistan’s objectives in called on the Taliban government to role in Central Asia–South Asia con-
consultations between Iran, India and propping up forces in Afghanistan, which combat the Uyghur-separatist East nectivity, promptly reached out to the
Uzbekistan, held in Tehran in Sep- can limit India’s role in the country. For Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) Taliban to help them utilize Chabahar
tember 2025, underscored the need to Beijing, a marginalized Indian role in and to resume bilateral patrols in the as the reliable route to international
deepen cooperation on connectivity, Afghanistan will render India’s oppo- Wakhan Corridor. In his meeting with markets and operationalize the Khaf–
the strategic use of Chabahar, and the sition to CPEC ineffective and reduce the Taliban Interior Minister Sirajud- Herat railway line. As Afghanistan’s
International North-South Transport its ability to influence the connectivity din Haqqani, Wang Yi stated, transit and trade via Pakistan remains
Corridor (INSTC). landscape of Central Asia. The recently Strengthening security coopera- suspended and Kabul wants to re-
The rising frequency of infiltration upgraded diplomatic and commercial tion between China and Afghanistan duce its reliance on Pakistan, it opens
by terrorists into Tajikistan, resulting engagement between the Taliban and will provide a guarantee for econom- opportunities for Iran to enhance its
in armed clashes with Tajik border New Delhi has alarmed Islamabad, ic cooperation, while deepening eco- connectivity and logistics role for both
guards, threatens to undermine the na- which is levelling accusations of Indian nomic cooperation will also enhance Afghanistan and Central Asia.
scent diplomatic engagement between support for Afghan militants. This may Afghanistan’s security capabilities.
Tajikistan and the Taliban in Afghani- further convince Islamabad to support In Kabul, Wang Yi also partici- CONCLUSION
stan. The Taliban assured Tajik author- armed opposition forces in Afghanistan. pated in the 6th China–Pakistan–Af- he escalating conflict between
ities of its full cooperation, while blam- Since 2017, China has used a ghanistan trilateral foreign ministers’ Pakistan and the Taliban and
ing the attack on an unnamed armed foreign minister-level trilateral mech- dialogue, which resulted in no joint TIslamabad’s paranoia about
group which, it said, was “striving to cre- anism to ease strained ties between communique. Notably, the Chinese growing India–Afghanistan engage-
ate chaos and instability in the region Afghanistan and Pakistan and press statement noted that, ment is pushing Pakistan to take an
and to sow distrust among countries”. for cooperation in tackling the ter- The three parties should expand increasingly securitized view of the Tal-
rorist threats to China’s domestic and development cooperation, improve iban-ruled Afghanistan. Given that Pa-
CHINA AND PAKISTAN’S overseas projects. After the Taliban security dialogue mechanisms, deepen kistan has historically played a key role
GROWING SECURITIZATION OF takeover, the trilateral consultations law enforcement and security coop- in Beijing’s Afghanistan policy, the two
AFGHANISTAN resumed in 2023. eration, strengthen efforts to combat countries are likely to follow a coordi-
A key agenda item of discussions
transnational terrorist activities and
or both Russia and China, Af- has been the extension of CPEC to address the root causes of terrorism nated approach towards Afghanistan.
At a time when India is deepening its
ghanistan, together with Central Afghanistan, to enhance trilateral co- through comprehensive measures
FAsia, constitutes a unified geo- operation in security and connectivity. based on consensus. There was no economic and political engagement
with the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, it
political space, the first circle of exter- Given China’s longstanding policy of mention of extending the CPEC to stands to benefit from greater conver-
nal security and stability, and is consid- non-interference in internal affairs, Afghanistan, indicating the growing gence and coordination with the neigh-
ered crucial for Eurasian connectivity Beijing is using its economic leverage salience of security concerns. bors of Afghanistan.
projects. The emergence of the Islamic in Afghanistan through Pakistan to
State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in build leverage. However, the conflict INDIA’S REGIONAL DIPLOMACY Dr. Deepika Saraswat is Associate Fellow
Afghanistan in 2014 and imperatives between Pakistan and the Taliban has ON AFGHANISTAN at the West Asia Centre. Her research
of security in the north-western Chi- escalated in the wake of TTP attacks interests include Iran’s geopolitics in
nese region of Xinjiang, especially in targeting Chinese projects and nation- n recent years, India’s growing in- Middle East and Eurasia and interpenetra-
tion of religion and politics in postcolonial
the post-US withdrawal context, led als in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. stitutionalized engagement with contexts. Her research project at MP-IDSA
Beijing to seek a more “proactive po- Along the Afghanistan–Pakistan bor- Ithe Central Asian States through is on ‘Iran’s Asian Orientation: Quest for
sition” in Afghanistan. der, Beijing has found it challenging the India–Central Asia Dialogue at Status and Regional Cooperation. Dr.
Notably, Pakistan has remained to maintain its position as a neutral fa- the Foreign Minister Level, which has Saraswat has a PhD in Political Geography
an influential factor in China’s ap- cilitator and mediator, creating space been held regularly since 2019, the from Centre for International Politics Or-
proach towards Afghanistan, given for other actors in West Asia, mainly India–Central Asia Summit held in ganisation and Disarmament, Jawaharlal
Pakistan’s close ties with the Taliban. Qatar and Turkey, to play a role in es- January 2022, and the India–Central Nehru University, New Delhi.
In a dual-track approach linking eco- tablishing a ceasefire in October 2025. Asia Joint Working Group on Chaba- Views expressed are of the author and do not
nomic engagement to strengthening The instability created by har Port, has been framed within the necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar
security cooperation, China has sought cross-border clashes between Afghan- vision of an integrated and stable ex- Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
to build leverage over authorities in istan and Pakistan, which diverts the tended neighborhood. This article first appeared in the Comments
Kabul. On the one hand, Beijing seeks limited security resources of the Tali- India’s embrace of a geoeconom- section of the website (www.idsa.in) of
to benefit from its investment in large- ban, stands to benefit armed opposi- ics-driven approach, as underlined by Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense
scale projects in Afghanistan’s mineral tion and transnational terrorist groups the “4Cs” framework prioritizing com- Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, on
extraction, energy and infrastructure in Afghanistan, creating renewed fears merce, capacity enhancement, con- January 1, 2025

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