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    OPINION                                                                   JULY 17, 2026    |  The Indian Eye 10

                         The Indo-Pacific without

                                       the Indo: Strategic

                            Consequences for India

             The retirement of ‘Indo’ from a military command is a symbol, not a rupture. But symbols carry information,

               and this one says something real: American strategy is narrowing towards a Pacific deterrence problem in
                        which India’s geography matters less than it did when the Indo-Pacific was first conceived

            PRIYANSHU AGRAWAL

                   n 16 June 2026, the Pentagon
                   retired a name it had carried
            Ofor eight years. U.S. Indo-Pa-
            cific Command reverted to its older
            title, U.S. Pacific Command, and De-
            fense Secretary Pete Hegseth marked
            the occasion tersely on social media:
            “U.S. Pacific Command is back.” The
            ‘Indo’ in Indo-Pacific had been, more
            than anything, an American acknowl-
            edgement of India’s centrality to its
            Asia strategy. Dropping it raises a
            question New Delhi cannot afford to
            dismiss: can the Indo-Pacific remain
            strategically coherent if India is no
            longer central to it, and does the shift
            point to something deeper than a bu-
            reaucratic housekeeping exercise?
             The Making of the Indo-Pacific

                  he  Indo-Pacific  was  an  Indi-
                  an idea before it became an
            TAmerican strategy. The con-
            cept’s modern geopolitical usage
            is widely attributed to Indian naval
            strategist Gurpreet Khurana, whose   The Biden administration’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy made the investment explicit: it pledged to “support India’s continued rise and regional leadership” (File photo)
            2007 paper described the arc linking
            Indian Ocean energy routes to East   creasing connectivity between the In-  “support  India’s continued  rise  and   ed India to be part of a deterrence
            Asian manufacturing centres as a dis-  dian and Pacific oceans”. The name   regional leadership”. It named it first   architecture  aimed  at  China;  New
            tinct strategic theatre. Japan’s Prime   was not neutral cartography. It was a   among the leading regional partners   Delhi wanted technological and geo-
            Minister Shinzo Abe gave it political   signal that the United States consid-  Washington  would  cultivate  beyond   political gains without any obligation
            momentum in his address to the Indi-  ered the Indian Ocean as relevant to   its five treaty alliances (Japan, South   to fight alongside the United States.
            an Parliament the same year, describ-  the China competition as the West-  Korea, Australia, the Philippines and   The  Indo-Pacific  worked  partly  be-
            ing the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a   ern Pacific.               Thailand).  The  strategy  defined  the   cause it left this ambiguity intact.
            “Confluence of the Two Seas”         Why India Became Central       region as stretching “from our Pacific   Is the Indo Disappearing?
                The  first  Trump  administra-                                  coastline to the Indian Ocean”, push-
            tion elevated this from geography    ndia mattered to this construct   ing the western boundary further     he signals from Washington
            to doctrine. The 2017 National Se-   because of its landmass and posi-  than the 2017 document.             since January 2025 suggest a
            curity  Strategy  defined  the  region  Ition. It anchored the western end   The  Quad  became  the  flagship   Tgenuine, if still uneven, recali-
            as stretching “from the west coast   of the map, commanded sea lanes   expression of this alignment. At the   bration. The second Trump adminis-
            of India to the western shores of   through which a large share of global   Wilmington Summit of September   tration’s approach to Asia is organ-
            the United States” and placed it at   energy and trade passes, and offered   2024, the four leaders declared them-  ised around the Western Hemisphere
            the top of US regional priorities. In   the only large democratic power in   selves “more strategically aligned   first  and  Pacific  deterrence  second.
            May  2018,  Defense  Secretary  Jim   Asia capable of independently com-  than ever before”, representing   The National Security Strategy of
            Mattis  renamed  Pacific  Command   plicating Chinese ambitions over the   “nearly two billion people and over   November 2025 primarily referenc-
            to Indo-Pacific Command. The De-  long term. The Biden administration’s   one-third of global GDP”. Yet the   es India in the South Asian context,
            partment of Defense announcement   2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy made the   partnership always rested on a con-  urging New Delhi to “contribute
            stated the change reflected “the in-  investment explicit: it pledged to   cealed tension. Washington want-  Continued on next page... >>

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