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Page 13 - The Indian EYE 061926
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    OPINION                                                                  JUNE 19, 2026     |  The Indian Eye 13

                A zero-day vulnerability discov-                                                                  intelligence agencies, national cyber
            ered and exploited at machine speed                                                                   authorities, critical infrastructure
            can transform a battlefield advantage                                                                 operators, the defence industry, and
            into an operational liability. The crit-                                                              academia around shared standards,
            ical question for military planners is                                                                information exchange, coordinated
            therefore not merely what capability                                                                  vulnerability management and joint
            a technology delivers, but what vul-                                                                  exercises. An equivalent of Project
            nerability it introduces and what mis-                                                                Glasswing of the US needs to be
            sion impact will result if that technol-                                                              launched. National security is insepa-
            ogy is compromised.                                                                                   rable from national digital resilience.
                History suggests that resilient                                                                       India’s simultaneous force mod-
            forces retain the ability to fight when                                                               ernisation, digital infrastructure ex-
            technology is denied, degraded, or                                                                    pansion, indigenous defence technol-
            deceived. GPS-based navigation may                                                                    ogy development and AI investment
            be faster and more accurate. Howev-                                                                   create both significant opportunities
            er, forces must still retain the ability                                                              and new attack surfaces. Priority ar-
            to navigate through maps, terrain as-                                                                 eas include:
            sociation and celestial methods when                                                                  • Sovereign, indigenous security
            satellites are jammed or attacked.                                                                      technologies for defence systems.
            AI-assisted targeting may compress    India’s simultaneous force modernisation, digital infrastructure expansion, indigenous de-  • Secure defence cloud and trusted
            sensor-to-shooter  timelines,  but  fence technology development and AI investment create both significant opportunities and new   semiconductor ecosystems.
            commanders must still possess alter-                                                                  • National cyber ranges and inte-
            native procedures when algorithms                        attack surfaces (File Photo)                   grated test beds.
            fail or are manipulated.                                                                              • Advanced defensive  AI tools and
                A resilience assessment should   continuous automated discovery of   human approval for all AI-gener-  vulnerability intelligence programs.
            therefore accompany every tech-   mission-critical vulnerabilities across   ated fixes.                   Doctrine integrating cyber oper-
            nology infusion: Can the mission   military, civilian and industrial net-  • Network Segmentation and Zero   ations with MDO across digital, cog-
            continue if a zero-day vulnerability   works. Cyber exploitation in this con-  Trust:  Restrict lateral movement   nitive, electromagnetic, space and
            compromises the system? Is there a   text becomes operational manoeuvre.  within your network to contain   kinetic domains.
            manual fallback, a parallel architec-                                 damage if a zero-day successfully   Future  conflicts  involving  India
            ture, or an alternative means of ex-      Security by Design          executes.                       will not be fought through kinetic
            ecution? In an era when AI can dis-   With the above AI-enabled cy-  • Critical questions must be answer-  means alone. Preparedness demands
            cover and weaponise vulnerabilities   ber threat challenges, security cannot   able before conflict: Can missions   addressing these realities now.
            faster than defenders can respond,   be bolted on after development. It   continue under degraded commu-         Conclusion
            the objective of modernisation is not   must be a core design requirement—  nications? Where are single points   AI-generated zero-day vulner-
            simply to become more digital but to   alongside survivability, mobility, reli-  of failure? How quickly can net-  abilities mark a fundamental shift in
            become more capable without be-   ability and safety—with the explicit   works recover? Without realistic   the character of warfare.   Cyber ex-
            coming more fragile. The most effec-  assumption that adversaries will ap-  environments,  many  vulnerabili-  ploitation will  increasingly function
            tive military force will not be the one   ply advanced vulnerability discovery   ties  remain  invisible  until  conflict   as a manoeuvre capability—degrad-
            with the most technology, but the   techniques throughout the system’s   exposes them. This needs to be   ing  command,  disrupting  logistics,
            one that can continue to fight when   entire service life. Every platform   avoided at all costs.     blinding sensors and slowing decision
            that technology is under attack.  must be assessed not only for kinetic   Continuous validation in an   cycles. For military organisations, the
                                              performance but for cyber resilience.   MDO  environment  is  necessary,  as
            Cyber Exploitation as a Manoeuvre   The question is not whether vulnera-  periodic evaluation is incompatible   implication is clear: cyber security
                       Capability                                                                                 must be embedded in force design,
                An  increase  in  ‘attack  surfaces’   bilities exist; it is whether the mission   with the modern threat tempo. Ev-  capability development, operation-
            for cyber exploitation in itself is not   can survive despite them.  ery major exercise must incorporate   al planning and doctrine. The future
                                                  Testing platforms in isolation is
                                                                                realistic cyber-attack scenarios: com-
            a serious vulnerability. However, an   insufficient; modern warfare requires   munications disruption, data manip-  will belong to the force that maintains
            ‘AI-enabled automated cyber-attack’   testing systems-of-systems. National   ulation,  autonomous  system  com-  command integrity, preserves deci-
            can generate cascading effects across   test beds must replicate operational   promise and decision-support tool   sion superiority and continues fighting
            every  warfighting  domain.  A  single   networks,  joint architectures,  space   failure. Commanders must learn to   under continuous digital disruption.
            vulnerability in a satellite ground sta-  assets, tactical communications, au-  operate in degraded digital environ-  Lt Gen Karanbir Singh Brar, PVSM,
            tion can degrade space links, disrupt   tonomous platforms, and defence   ments as routine practice. The force   AVSM (Retd), is a former DG Ar-
            unmanned system feeds, slow ISR,   industrial supply chains—and sup-  that fights through disruption holds a   moured Corps and GOC Dakshin
            extend strike timelines and reduce   port continuous red-teaming with   decisive operational advantage. Resil-  Bharat Area. Presently, he is a Dis-
            operational tempo—a flaw in cyber-  advanced attack tools. Military net-  ience is now a warfighting capability.  tinguished Strategic Advisor with IIT
            space generating effects in space, air   works and architecture need to have                          Madras PRAVARTAK (Tech Innovation
            and land simultaneously.          the following:                          Whole-of-Government                   Hub of IITM).
                An adversary need not compro-                                              Imperative
            mise every system—only the weakest   • Detection-First/Behaviour-Based   Automated vulnerabilities do   Views expressed are of the author and
                                                Architecture:  Use endpoint solu-
            digital pathway that yields dispro-  tions that stop active execution   not respect organisational bound-  do not necessarily reflect the views of
            portionate operational effect. Auto-  and exploit-chain behaviour the   aries. Military systems depend on   the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
            mated tools greatly enhance the abil-  moment an attack occurs.     civilian infrastructure; civilian in-    Government of India.
            ity to identify such pathways across   • Automated AI Red Teaming:   frastructure  depends  on  private   This article first appeared in the
            command systems, logistics networks,   Leverage  autonomous  AI  agents   industry; private industry depends   Comments section of the website (www.
            satellite assets,  tactical  communica-  internally to find vulnerabilities in   on global software supply chains. A   idsa.in) of Manohar Parrikar Institute
            tions,  and  defence-industrial  supply   your dependency graphs before   whole-of-government approach is es-  for Defense Studies and Analyses, New
            chains. Future campaigns may feature
                                                adversaries do, while maintaining   sential, integrating the armed forces,   Delhi, on June 8, 2026

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