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    OPINION                                                                  APRIL 24, 2026    |  The Indian Eye 11

            by 2027. In the first 36 hours of Oper-                                                               because  producers  serve  multiple
            ation Epic Fury, Iran fired over 1,000                                                                customers  and  can  absorb  losses.
            munitions across West Asia. In re-                                                                    Military procurement differs: often,
            sponse, US, Israeli and allied forces                                                                 the government is the sole buyer, so
            fired more than 3,000 precision-guid-                                                                 reduced orders can shutter produc-
            ed munitions and interceptors.                                                                        tion lines or close firms. Rebuilding
                In  view of the foregoing,  it  is                                                                capacity is difficult due to a limited
            important to contextualize military                                                                   workforce,  labor-intensive  systems,
            engagement such as Operation SIN-                                                                     and fragile supply chains, including
            DOOR involving the armed forces                                                                       vulnerable  sub-contractors  and  for-
            of India and Pakistan. The 87-hour                                                                    eign dependencies.
            technology-driven  military  conflict,                                                                    India   Requires   a   Hybrid
            which  witnessed  one  of  the  biggest                                                               Mode—Combining  Advanced  Ca-
            air battles from stand-off ranges of                                                                  pabilities with Robust Mass-Produc-
            100–150 km between peer adversar-                                                                     tion Capacity and Strategic Reserves
            ies, besides extensive use of missiles,                                                                   The  post–Cold  War  decline
            drones and AD systems and culmi-                                                                      in US peer-adversary competition
            nating with the Indian Air Force es-                                                                  contributed  to  a  lean,  technolo-
            tablishing its supremacy by targeting                                                                 gy-intensive defense industrial base
            Pakistani airfields and other military                                                                optimized for precision, “exquisite”
            targets using some of the most ad-                                                                    systems and short-duration wars.
            vanced  missiles  available  anywhere   Russia’s approach in Ukraine has emphasized mass, depth and endurance (File photo)  While  highly  capable,  this  model
            in the world today. The question that                                                                 has proven less suited to sustained,
            merits deliberation is: Is Operation   strikes on command-and-control   levels. At the same time, it has ex-  high-intensity attritional warfare
            SINDOOR the template for all fu-  networks,  logistics  hubs  and  indus-  panded defense production—partic-  that requires large-scale ammuni-
            ture  India–Pakistan  conflicts?  And,   trial infrastructure.      ularly drones and munitions—while   tion and platform replacement.
            how should India prepare for future   The Russian government  has   balancing  expenditure  with  replen-  By contrast, Russia’s approach
            wars?                             undertaken sustained and coordi-  ishment capacity. Crucially, Russia   in Ukraine has emphasized mass,
                India  shares  borders  with  two   nated  efforts—both  before  and  af-  has shifted towards a war-of-attrition   depth and endurance. In this con-
            adversarial  neighbors—China  and   ter the onset of the war—to shield   model, leveraging manpower mo-  struct, advanced systems are often
            Pakistan—while also contending    its defense industrial base from the   bilization  and  industrial  resilience   enabling  tools,  while  warfighting
            with ongoing proxy wars and in-   effects of Western sanctions and ex-  rather than technological superior-  effectiveness depends heavily on
            surgencies. In this context, India’s   port  controls.  The  mobilization  of   ity. Despite sanctions constraining   volume, stockpiles and industrial
            armed forces and its supporting de-  the defense industrial sector is part   access to advanced systems,  Russia   throughput. Russia has sustained op-
            fense-industrial ecosystem must pre-  of  this  broader  strategy,  alongside   has adapted by substituting, sourcing   erations through continuous defense
            pare for the most demanding con-  the development of sanctions-eva-  externally, and adopting lower-tech   spending,  expanded  production
            tingency:  a  protracted,  large-scale,   sion mechanisms to secure critical   solutions, enabling it to sustain oper-  shifts, reactivation of dormant facil-
            two- or even two-and-a-half-front   resources and maintain the supply   ations over time.             ities,  and  large-scale  refurbishment
            conventional war. Scenarios short of   of military equipment necessary for   In its war in Ukraine, Russia has   of  Soviet-era  equipment,  thereby
            this threshold can be managed with-  a protracted war.              lost thousands of tanks across differ-  offsetting heavy battlefield losses.
            in the existing capabilities of the In-  Russia  anticipated  Western  ent generations. However, it retains   For India, the key lesson is the
            dian armed forces.                sanctions well in advance and pre-  extensive Soviet-era stockpiles of   importance  of  balancing  techno-
                Two important factors under-  pared through its ‘Fortress Russia’   tanks and other armored vehicles,   logical  sophistication  with  scalable
            pinning Russia’s capacity to sustain   strategy,  supported  by  the  Central   which  it  is  using  to  replace  battle-  industrial capacity. A  defense eco-
            a prolonged war are its doctrinal ap-  Bank’s effective crisis response,   field losses. This reliance on stored   system optimized only for high-
            proach to warfare and the resilience   which  blunted  the  expected  eco-  equipment allows Russia to sustain   end platforms risks constraints in
            of its defense industrial base, despite   nomic shock. It also strengthened   the  conflict  for  several  more  years,   prolonged war scenarios. Equally
            continued economic pressure from   economic ties with China and other   effectively prioritizing quantity over   important is maintaining depth in
            Western sanctions. Its war effort has   non-Western partners. After sanc-  quality in its force structure.  ammunition stocks, surge produc-
            been  supported  by  strong  energy   tions were imposed, Moscow adopt-  The contrasting experiences of   tion  capability,  and  resilient  supply
            revenues, careful financial manage-  ed additional counter-measures, in-  the US and Russia highlight import-  chains that can be rapidly mobilized
            ment, and the willingness of several   cluding sanctions-evasion networks.   ant lessons for India’s defense pre-  in wartime.
            countries to continue trading despite   These involved  the use of front   paredness and industrial strategy.  A  hybrid  model—combining
            the threat of sanctions. Additional-  companies in third countries, along   Sustainment should be elevated   advanced precision capabilities with
            ly, Russia has been able to procure   with alternative mechanisms such as   to a Formal Principle of War  robust mass-production capacity and
            weapons and equipment from part-  cryptocurrencies and barter trade, to   Armed forces worldwide con-  strategic reserves—offers the most
            ners such as North Korea.         access restricted goods and sustain   front several challenges in sustain-  credible path for sustaining high-in-
                Russia’s concept of operations   economic and military resilience.  ing  large-scale  combat  operations,   tensity operations over time.
            in Ukraine has evolved significantly   Drawing on International Insti-  whether offensive or defensive. To   Views expressed are of the author and
            since  the  initial  invasion  in  Febru-  tute for Strategic Studies (IISS) as-  address these, sustainment should   do not necessarily reflect the views of
            ary 2022. It has transitioned from an   sessments in The Military Balance,   be elevated to a formal principle of   the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
            early attempt at rapid regime change   Russia’s ability to sustain a protract-  war, highlighting the strategic im-  Government of India.
            and a decisive military victory to a   ed war despite sanctions rests on ad-  portance of logistics and reinforcing
            prolonged attritional campaign cen-  aptation, scale and resource depth.   the need to integrate the defense   The full version of this article first ap-
            tered  on  making  incremental  gains   Russia  has  offset  heavy  battlefield   industrial base more effectively into   peared in the Comments section of the
            and consolidating territory in eastern   losses by drawing extensively on vast   deterrence and defense strategies.  website (www.idsa.in) of Manohar Par-
            Ukraine  and  degrading  Ukrainian   Soviet-era  stockpiles,  refurbishing   In  civilian  markets,  fluctuating   rikar Institute for Defense Studies and
            military capability through sustained   older equipment to maintain force   demand rarely proves catastrophic   Analyses, New Delhi, on April 14, 2026

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