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    OPINION                                                                  APRIL 10, 2026    |  The Indian Eye 10

            Maritime Dimensions

                 of the West Asia War

              Despite the USs possessing overwhelming superiority over Iran in the naval domain, it has been

                   unable to deter or prevent Iranian disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz

                 SHAYESTA NISHAT AHMED

                   n  22  January  2026,  US
                   President  Donald  Trump
            Oannounced  that  a  massive
            American naval armada was head-
            ing  towards  Iran.  This  came  after
            weeks  of  speculation  regarding  the
            US  response  to  the  Iranian  govern-  ing it one of the most critical global   passing  through  the  Strait  of  Hor-  and hit-and-run tactics. It has grown
            ment’s crackdown on protestors. Mil-  energy chokepoints. Iran’s success in   muz. This brief assesses the evolving   to a strength of over 20,000 person-
            itary analysts and strategic observers   potentially blocking this chokepoint   dynamics of the maritime theatre of   nel,  with  a  fleet  comprising  thou-
            identified  this  naval  build-up  as  a   was bound to create a major global   the ongoing conflict.  sands of speedboats armed with an
            precursor  to  an  imminent  war  with   shipping  crisis,  thereby  generating   While the US has been over-  array  of  weapons,  including  short-
            Iran.  The  build-up  of  the  US  naval   international pressure on the US and   whelmingly  successful  in  destroy-  range  anti-ship  missiles.  In  recent
            posture in the days leading up to the   its allies in the region.   ing or incapacitating most of Iran’s   years,  the  IRGCN  has  further  en-
            current hostilities clearly illustrated   As  the  war  has  progressed  be-  frontline naval assets, it remains far   hanced its capabilities by deploying
            two critical attributes of the US Na-  yond a fortnight, it can be observed   from fully neutralising the threat to   aerial drones, Unmanned Under-
            vy’s intended role. First, to spearhead   that the hostilities in the maritime   commercial  shipping  posed  by  the   water Vehicles (UUVs), and Un-
            offensive kinetic operations aimed at   theatre  have  manifested  largely  in   IRGC’s  paramilitary  naval  forces   manned Surface Vehicles (USVs).
            destroying  strategic  targets  and  de-  line with the naval strategies of both   and shore-based maritime strike ca-  The IRGC-Navy operates large
            grading Iran’s capability to retaliate.  belligerents.  The  naval  efforts  of   pabilities.         numbers of fast-attack craft armed
            Second,  to  support  defensive  oper-  both sides have been directed to-  The  Islamic  Revolutionary  with missiles and rockets to conduct
            ations across the region by strength-  wards  achieving  their  strategic  ob-  Guard  Corps  Navy  (IRGCN)  was   saturation attacks on surface vessels.
            ening air-defence grids for protecting   jectives that were anticipated before   established  in  1985  as  a  paramili-  Iran has also deployed shore-based
            vital US military infrastructure and   the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The  US,  tary maritime force with a mandate   missile batteries and one-way attack
            its allies in West Asia.          while succeeding in destroying most   to  supplement  the  conventional  ca-  (OWA) drones and cluster muni-
                Iran, on the other hand, despite   of  Iran’s  major  naval  assets,  includ-  pabilities of the Iranian Navy while   tions along its coastline to strength-
            possessing  relatively  modest  naval   ing  several  frontline  warships,  has   also conducting asymmetric warfare   en  maritime  defence.  Specialised
            capabilities,  was  expected  to  lever-  not fully managed to prevent attacks   independently in littoral waters. As   vessels  such  as  Shahid  Bagheri
            age  its  geographic  positioning  by   on  neutral  shipping  or  the  disrup-  such,  the  IRGCN  has  focused  on   drone carrier, IRIS Shahid Rouda-
            threatening  or  attempting  to  block   tion of maritime traffic through the   the rapid mobilisation of a voluntary   ki, and IRIS Shahid Mahdavi can
            the  Strait  of  Hormuz,  thereby  dis-  Strait of Hormuz. Iran, on the other   seafaring  militia  and  small,  fast-at-  launch drone swarms and container-
            rupting  global  energy  shipping.  Ap-  hand, despite suffering major losses   tack boats suitable for littoral oper-  ised missiles at sea targets.
            proximately 20 million barrels of oil   of its naval capability within the ini-  ations. The IRGCN was developed   The  narrow  Strait  of  Hormuz
            per day—accounting for over 20 per   tial  days  of  the  War,  has  managed   to  spearhead  Iran’s  mosquito  fleet   (about 33 km wide with 3 km ship-
            cent  of  global  consumption—pass   to exert substantial pressure on the   strategy,  to  harass  enemy  vessels   ping  lanes)  allows  Iran  to  disrupt
            through the Strait of Hormuz, mak-  US by relentlessly targeting shipping   through ambushes, precision strikes,   Continued on next page... >>

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