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    OPINION                                                                  APRIL 10, 2026    |  The Indian Eye 11

            traffic  using  missiles,  fast  boats,  time drones. Since the outbreak of   flict.  China,  the  largest  buyer  of   naval  engagements,  therefore,  fall
            naval mines, submarines and un-   war, at least 13 commercial vessels   Iranian  crude  oil,  depends  heavily   under international humanitarian
            manned  systems.  IRGC  Navy’s    have reportedly been attacked, pos-  on  supplies  passing  through  this   obligations,  even  during  active  hos-
            crewed and uncrewed ‘mosquito     sibly  by  Iran,  in  areas  surrounding   chokepoint,  making  disruptions  a   tilities. Following the sinking of IRIS
            fleet’,  comprising  more  than  1,500   the Strait of Hormuz. On 12 March   major  energy-security  concern.  US   Dena, distress signals were reportedly
            small attack craft under 10 tons, is   2026, news reports indicated that six   President Donald Trump has stated   transmitted, prompting regional SAR
            designed  to  convert  numerical  den-  commercial vessels were attacked by   that the US Navy could escort tank-  operations conducted by nearby mar-
            sity into kinetic saturation rather   explosive-laden  boats  or  struck  by   ers through the Strait if required to   itime  authorities.  International  mar-
            than  platform  survivability.  These   sea mines, presumably laid by Iran.  maintain global energy flows.  itime law also permits neutral states
            vessels,  capable  of  speeds  between   These  developments  demonstrate   Naval  engagements  between   to  conduct  humanitarian  rescue  op-
            50  and  110  knots,  exploit  accelera-  Iran’s ability to cause serious disrup-  states  are  governed  by  the  Law  of   erations,  provided  that  such  actions
            tion and manoeuvrability to com-  tions in the Gulf Waters through its   Armed Conflict at Sea, derived from   remain strictly non-military and con-
            press engagement timelines, thereby   shore-based operations.       the  Second  Geneva  Convention   sistent with the principle of neutrality.
            forcing advanced radar and fire-con-  Most  importantly,  Iran  is  like-  (1949), the United Nations Conven-  As the hostilities have continued
            trol systems aboard US destroyers   ly  to  seek  to  replicate  the  strategy   tion  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (1982),  for nearly a month, the maritime the-
            to  divide  targeting  resources  under   employed by Yemen’s Houthis, who   and customary rules reflected in the   atre is increasingly shaping the war’s
            swarm pressure.                   have carried out sustained attacks   San Remo Manual on International   strategic  outcome.  Despite  the  US
                Swarm density in narrow choke-  on commercial vessels in the Red   Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts   possessing  overwhelming  superiori-
            points  can  overwhelm  sensor  dis-  Sea  since  October  2023.  Notably,  at Sea (1994). According to the UN   ty over Iran in the naval domain, it
            crimination  algorithms,  compelling   the Houthis continued their strikes   Charter,  Article  2(4)  prohibits  the   has been unable to deter or prevent
            defenders  to  expend  high-cost  in-  despite  a  massive  US-led  kinetic   use of force, but Article 51 allows   Iranian  disruption  of  maritime  traf-
            terceptors  against  low-cost  craft  in   air  campaign  against  them  as  part   states to act in self-defence if they   fic in the Strait of Hormuz. This has
            economically asymmetric exchanges.  of  Operation  Prosperity  Guardian,  face an armed attack.       been evident in the fact that, despite
            The mosquito fleet thus functions as a   which  lasted  17  months.  As  part   Under  Article  29  of  UNCLOS,  President Trump boasting of the de-
            distributed maritime missile-launch-  of this operation, the US launched   a  warship  is  defined  as  a  vessel  be-  struction of the Iranian Navy, on 15
            er  network  optimised  for  rapid,  nearly  1,000  sorties  targeting  the   longing to the armed forces of a state,  March 2026, he appealed to Europe-
            widespread  dispersal  along  Iran’s   Houthis’  shore-based  launch  capa-  commanded by a commissioned offi-  an  nations  and  other  powers  to  de-
            2,400-kilometre  coastline.  The  fleet   bilities. Yet the Houthis successfully   cer and operated by a military crew   ploy their warships in the region to
            is not peripheral but foundational to   concealed,  transported  and  replen-  under discipline. Such vessels retain   aid the US Navy in securing maritime
            Tehran’s  A2/AD  architecture,  con-  ished  their  strike  capabilities  using   their  combatant  status  at  all  times.  traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
            verting geographic constraint into a   extensive underground networks. As   The law of naval warfare does not   However,  most  nations,  including
            weaponised maritime ecosystem.    the war progresses, Iran may seek to   require prior warning or a demand   the US’s closest allies, such as the
                Missiles such as the Nasr and   employ tactics similar to those used   for surrender before attacking an en-  UK and Germany, swiftly declined to
            Kowsar  provide  short-range,  super-  by the Houthis, who are widely re-  emy  warship.  Hostilities  are  legally   participate in any such effort, aware
            sonic, precision-guided engagement   garded  as  one  of  Iran’s  key  region-  permissible on the high seas and in   of  the  complexities  of  securing  the
            envelopes  of  up  to  25  kilometres,  al proxies. In fact, on 9 March 2026,  international  waters,  provided  that   Strait of Hormuz militarily.
            enabling  rapid  strike-and-break-  the Houthis’ leader announced that   operations  do  not  occur  within  the   Iran’s selective restrictions on
            contact  tactics  in  congested  waters.  the group was ready to enter the war   territorial waters of neutral states,  transit  showcase  how  geopolitical
            The  Ghader  missile  has  a  range  of   in support of Iran.       where  neutrality  protections  apply.  alignments  influence  commercial
            200–300  kilometres,  allowing  coast-                              The use of submarines, surface com-  navigation  and  international  trade
            al  launch  platforms  to  target  naval   Following US–Israeli strikes on   batants, or aerial platforms does not   flows.  While  naval  engagements  in
            formations before carriers can bring   Iran in late February 2026, ‘Op-  affect the legality of the engagement,  such  contexts  remain  governed  by
            their full air wings to bear.                                       as the same legal standards apply to   established  legal  frameworks,  in-
                The Zafar  variant  increases  eration Epic Fury’, Iran moved   all naval combat platforms.       cluding  UNCLOS  and  the  Gene-
            stand-off  range,  reinforcing  a  lay-  to restrict passage through    The Second Geneva Convention,  va  Conventions,  the  situation  also
            ered  missile  perimeter  that  forces   the Strait of Hormuz, causing   particularly Article 2 and Chapter 2,  reinforces the continued relevance
            US  forces  to  operate  further  off-                              specifically  regulates  the  protection   of  humanitarian  obligations  at  sea.
            shore or under continuous radar   a near halt in international      of  wounded,  sick  and  shipwrecked   Understanding  these  complexities
            vigilance.  The  Abu  Mahdi  missile,  commercial shipping from 28   members of armed forces at sea,  requires a more detailed assessment.
            reportedly  exceeding  1,000  kilome-  February 2026. The Strait is   thereby  introducing  humanitarian   But as predicted by several analysts,
            tres in range, represents a quantum                                 obligations  within  naval  warfare.  the  Strait  of  Hormuz  has  indeed
            escalation by potentially placing US   a critical chokepoint linking   Through  Articles  29–32,  UNCLOS   emerged  as  Iran’s  strategic  trump
            facilities in Qatar and Bahrain with- the Persian Gulf to global sea   recognises the legal status and sover-  card to resist the US’s overwhelming
            in  reach,  extending  the  maritime   lanes. It accounts for nearly 20   eign  immunity  of  warships  and  oth-  naval superiority. This has been a key
            confrontation  into  broader  Gulf   per cent  of global  oil exports,   er  government  vessels  operated  for   element around which Iran’s naval
            basing infrastructure. Zulfiqar-class                               non-commercial purposes.          strategy  has  been  developed  since
            boats, equipped with rapid-fire can- particularly from Saudi Arabia,    The Second Geneva Convention,  the 1990s.
            nons and short-range surface-to-air  the United Arab Emirates, Ku-  particularly Articles 12 and 18, obli-  Dr Shayesta Nishat Ahmed is a
            systems like the Kosar, serve as es-  wait, Iraq and Qatar, supplying   gates parties to a conflict to respect,   Research Analyst at the Manohar Par-
            cort screens, protecting missile boats                              protect and collect the wounded, sick
            from low-altitude counterattacks.  major markets such as China      and shipwrecked following naval en-  rikar Institute for Defence Studies and
                Iran  possesses  well-equipped  and India.                      gagements.  These provisions require   Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi
            shore-based   strike   capabilities,                                belligerent  forces,  where  operation-  The full version of this article first
            comprising an extensive network of    Iran  has  indicated that only   ally feasible, to rescue survivors, pro-  appeared in the Comments section of
            coastal batteries that can launch An-  vessels  linked  to  China  would  be   vide medical assistance, and ensure   the website (www.idsa.in) of Manohar
            ti-Ship  Ballistic  Missiles  (ASBMs)   allowed to transit the Strait of Hor-  humane  treatment  irrespective  of   Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies
            and  Anti-Ship  Cruise  Missiles  (AS-  muz,  reflecting  Beijing’s  relatively   nationality.          and Analyses, New Delhi, on March
            CMs),  as  well  as  aerial  and  mari-  supportive  stance  during  the  con-  Distress  situations  arising  after   23, 2026

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