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    OPINION                                                                MARCH 27, 2026      |  The Indian Eye 10

                      Cyber Operations in the

            Israel–US Conflict with Iran

             Senior US military officials stated that coordinated cyber and space activities degraded

                         Iranian communications, sensors and command-and-control networks

            CHERIAN SAMUEL
                  yberattacks have formed an
                  important supporting com-
            Cponent of the joint Israel–US
            campaign against Iran. However, the
            sheer  intensity of the kinetic con-
            flict has largely put these operations
            in the shade. As is increasingly the
            trend  in  modern  conflict,  cyber  ca-
            pabilities were employed to advance
            both tactical and strategic objectives
            in the early stages of the conflict.
                Cyber operations play a critical
            role in shaping the battlefield, with
            actions designed to weaken the
            adversary’s  defences,  morale  and                                                                                       Courtesy: IDSA
            command capabilities before kinetic
            hostilities commence. The combined
            capabilities of the United States and
                                                                                broken into municipal traffic-camera
            Israel ensured that a range of such   reported that Iran’s internet connec-  networks and used the live feeds to   erations underscore the use of cyber
                                              tivity dropped to about 4 per cent of
                                                                                                                  capabilities not only for disruption
            actions were undertaken even before   normal levels due to multi-layered   assess missile-strike damage, track   but also for shaping perception and
            the first bombs were dropped.     attacks on BGP routing, DNS infra-  emergency-response  movements,  influencing behaviour.
                Senior  US  military  officials
            stated that coordinated cyber and   structure  and  SCADA/ICS  systems,   and identify whether specific targets   Iran’s Cyber Capabilities and
                                              with some regions experiencing
                                                                                had been successfully hit. Such capa-
            space activities degraded Iranian   near-total blackouts. Who was re-  bilities highlight the role of cyber ac-  Response
            communications,  sensors  and  com-
                                                                                                                      Over the years, Iran has signifi-
            mand-and-control networks. Ac-    sponsible for this was difficult to as-  cess in enabling precision targeting,   cantly expanded its cyber warfare
                                              sess, as the Iranian government had
                                                                                blurring the line between intelligence
            cording  to  Gen.  Dan  Caine,  Chair-
            man  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,   itself imposed a blackout to prevent   collection and operational execution.  capabilities since the 2010 Stuxnet
            “The  first  movers  were  USCYBER-  civil unrest, which was likely inten-  Information Warfare and   attack, widely believed to be a joint
                                              sified by coordinated external cyber
                                                                                                                  Israel–US operation that caused its
            COM and USSPACECOM, layering      and military operations targeting Ira-  Psychological Operations    nuclear centrifuges to spin out of
            non-kinetic effects, disrupting and   nian communications infrastructure.  Coordinated cyberattacks simul-  control, evolving from limited DDoS
            degrading and blinding Iran’s ability   Among the initial strategic ob-  taneously targeted Iranian digital   and wiper malware to sophisticated
            to  see,  communicate  and  respond.”   jectives was the decapitation of the   infrastructure. Described in some   state-sponsored  cyber  operations
            Secretary of War Pete Hegseth also   regime. In the early phase of the con-  reports as the “largest cyberattack in   including large-scale destructive
            alluded to “classified effects”, which,   flict, Trump’s messaging implied that   history”, these operations disrupted   attacks, espionage, supply chain at-
            in US military parlance, refers to the   regime change or regime collapse in   government websites, mobile appli-  tacks, and identity weaponisation
            outcomes produced by an operation,   Iran could be a potential outcome of   cations and online platforms through   with remote wipe commands affect-
            not merely the tools employed, un-  the war. Among the tactical steps un-  outages and defacements. Follow-  ing hundreds of thousands of devices.
            derscoring the emphasis on integrat-  dertaken in pursuit of this goal was   ing Israeli strikes on facilities of the   The Stuxnet attack served as a cata-
            ed effects across the cyber, space and   targeting the entire regime leader-  state  broadcaster  IRIB,  Israeli  forc-  lyst, or “awakening”, prompting Iran
            kinetic domains.                  ship, including Ayatollah Khamenei.  es reportedly hijacked the broadcast   to invest heavily in cyber capabilities,
               Early Operational Effects         According  to  reports,  Israeli  in-  feed to air political messages urging   resulting in a 1,200 per cent increase
                On the second day of the conflict,  telligence leveraged existing access   resistance against the Iranian gov-  in cybersecurity budgets in the years
            the Israeli Defence Forces claimed   to  Tehran’s  traffic  camera  network   ernment. Additional psychological   following the incident.
            in a statement that the headquarters   and mobile phone infrastructure to   operations included the compromise   Iran has developed  advanced
            of the IRGC’s “cyber and electronic   trace the movements of the Iranian   of a widely used Iranian prayer ap-  cyber capabilities distributed primar-
            headquarters”  and  its  “Intelligence   leadership with unprecedented pre-  plication, through which messages   ily across organisations such as the
            Directorate” were destroyed in aeri-  cision. In earlier reports, Israeli offi-  encouraging security personnel to   Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
            al  strikes.  Monitoring  organisations   cials had said Iranian operators had   defect were disseminated. These op-  Continued on next page... >>

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